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HOW INDEPENDENT ARE INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY AGENCIES?
ALAN B. MORRISON*
Asking me to comment on how independent are independent regula-
tory agencies is rather like asking me to comment on the weather in Ant-
arctica: I've never been to either place, but I've seen both of them from
the outside, and at least have some impressions about them both. Some
of my observations were gleaned while I was an Assistant U.S. Attorney
in the Southern District of New York representing both independent and
"dependent" executive branch agencies. I also have litigated against
both varieties in the 16 years since I left that office. My present office has
also been involved at the administrative level with agencies of both kinds,
and, as a member of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
I have seen representatives of both groups participating in Conference
proceedings. Thus, while not an insider, I do have some impressions of
independent agencies, but they should be seen as no more than one per-
son's view, and not a full attempt to describe that landscape.
There is no official definition of an independent agency, either in the
Administrative Procedure Act, or elsewhere. Thus, the term may be de-
fined in many ways, but for me an independent agency is one whose
members may not be removed by the President except for cause, rather
than simply because the President no longer wishes them to serve, much
as he could dismiss the Secretary of State or other high officials in his
administration. To be sure, there are other characteristics generally asso-
ciated with independent agencies. Typically, they are multi-member
bodies, they usually have both rulemaking and adjudicative functions,
and there are often limits on the number of members of one political
party who may serve on them at any one time. None of these is a neces-
sary ingredient, nor are they unique to independent agencies.
The basic question to be asked is, how independent are independent
agencies? The answer, it seems to me, is "not very." The key person at
the independent agencies is the chairman who can be redesignated on an
annual basis by the President. In addition, the agency's budget must go
through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and, with only a
minor wrinkle or two, the independents are subject to the requirements
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of the Paperwork Reduction Act' and OMB's authority over the Act. It
is true that independent regulatory agencies are not yet subject to the
requirements of Executive Order No. 12,291,2 concerning the issuance of
rules, but the fact remains that independent agencies are still heavily af-
fected by the White House, especially on important issues, and especially
for those members who are interested in being reappointed. Thus, while
the independents are more independent than the executive agencies, the
difference in my view is not substantial.
It might be asked, then, what purposes are served by making the
agencies independent? The answer that has most often been given is to
insulate certain functions from political interference, principally from the
White House. But that kind of purpose could be served by statute, which
could make certain kinds of interference, for certain kinds of decisions,
impermissible, without altering the basic ability of the President to dis-
charge a member of a multi-member body at will, or at least for reasons
other than not violating a statutory restriction. Indeed, even Myers v.
United States, 3 the zenith of presidential power, recognizes that there are
certain functions that Congress may place in administrative agencies over
which the President has no control, even where the agency heads are
subject to his personal removal. Thus, while independence from dis-
charge, except for cause, may be an additional means of protection from
executive interference, it is by no means the only way that protection
could be achieved, particularly with respect to adjudications.
It also has been suggested that multi-member bodies are needed in
order to review decisions by administrative law judges, but that is not a
rationale for independent agencies, only for multi-member agencies, most
of which happen to be independent. Thus, administrative law judges at
the Social Security Administration have their decision regularly reviewed
not by independent agencies, but by the Appeals Council, which is a very
different kind of entity. Moreover, once again, there is no necessary ele-
ment in having a review of an administrative law decision by an in-
dependent commission: if you want multi-member review, you can
provide for that with or without the factor of independence.
One of the interesting phenomena of the Reagan administration is
that the independent regulatory agencies seem to be even less independ-
ent than they once were. Part of this may be due to the fact that Presi-
dent Reagan will serve two full terms, and thus any holdovers from the
prior administration will be long gone. In addition, the Reagan adminis-
1. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812.
2. 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 annot. at 431-34 (1982).
3. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (President has exclusive power of removal of executive officers ap-
pointed by and with advice and consent of Senate).
Vol. 1988:252]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [
tration has sought, and largely succeeded, in placing in all agencies, in-
dependent and otherwise, those who believe firmly in the Reagan view of
government-Democrats as well as Republicans. Therefore, the fact that
the President cannot fire them at will is of no significance, since most of
these so-called independent commissioners would not dream of doing
anything independent of what the President wanted anyway.
Take, for instance, James Miller, who was initially in charge of the
President's regulatory program at OMB, then became Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission, and then went back to OMB as its Director.
His views were no more (or less) independent in the middle job than they
were in the other two, and hence whatever the theoretical claim of inde-
pendence, the practical significance has been reduced considerably. Simi-
larly, at the Administrative Conference meetings, I have seen situations
in which the Administration has taken a strong position on an issue and
the views of representatives of independent agencies have not differed to
any degree, either for or against the administration position, from those
of purely executive branch members.
There is another important control on independent agencies that
brings them closer to the administration position. Most independent
agencies do not have their own litigating authority, and thus when they
go to court, they must ask the Department of Justice, which is under the
direct control of the President, to represent them. If the Justice Depart-
ment refuses to go along, or insists upon taking positions different from
those of the agency, there is nothing that can be done about it unless the
President can be motivated to instruct the Attorney General otherwise, a
highly unlikely situation. Even for those agencies, such as the National
Labor Relations Board, which are permitted to litigate most of their own
cases at the appeals court level, when it comes to Supreme Court litiga-
tion, including the all-important decision whether to request review or
not, that matter is committed to the exclusive province of the Solicitor
General, who works directly for .the Attorney General and hence the
President. I
Having said that, I should note that in at least one case with which I
am familiar, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission took its march-
ing orders from Congress and fought in every way possible to prevent the
constitutionality of the legislative veto in the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 from being decided on the merits, when the Justice Department was
doing its best to see that the issue was decided, and the veto was struck
down.4 The court of appeals eventually rejected the views of the Coin-
4. Consumer Energy Council of unerica v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, 463
U.S. 1216 (1983).
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mission, and when the matter got to the Supreme Court, the Commission
filed its papers, and the Justice Department fied its opposing views, but
that is one of the rare times that occurred. Moreover, the Commission
took no position on the constitutional issue, but simply argued the proce-
dural grounds against the challengers.
An outsider looking at the presence of independent commissions
might well ask, how is the decision made as to which commissions
should be independent? Originally, most of the independent commis-
sions were in the economic regulatory area, but that is not exclusively the
case today. In some situations, the distinction between executive and
independent agencies is plainly arbitrary, as evidenced by the fact that
the Department of Transportation (DOT) regulates the safety of
automobiles and the independent Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) regulates the safety of lawnmowers, bicycles, and three- and
four-wheel all-terrain vehicles. The decision to split the enforcement
function between those two bodies may or may not make sense, but it
seems hard to justify the differences on needs for independence regarding
the safety of Americans using those products. Indeed, insofar as I am
aware, the politics of the situation has affected regulation in both of those
agencies to a nearly equal degree, although some would even argue that
there has been more politics at the CPSC than at DOT.
Having said all this, does the conclusion necessarily follow that in-
dependent agencies can or should be abolished? One thing is clear, even
raising that question is likely to cause a furor on Capitol Hill, for few
ideas seem to offend members of the two Commerce committees more
than suggesting that independents should be abolished. This reaction is
plainly reflected in the decision of the President not to attempt to include
independent agencies in Executive Order 12,9915 dealing with cost bene-
fits and other regulatory matters, and it is surely a fact of political life
that any such efforts would be met with substantial resistance.
On the other hand, there seems to be little inclination in Congress to
take from the President the power to control the outcome of decision-
making by pure executive agencies, even though when similar issues are
presented to independent agencies, he lacks that power. Therefore, it
seems to me, that given the mood of the Congress, there is likely to be
little change in the landscape. Viewed analytically and compared with
similar functions performed elsewhere, the independence of some agen-
cies is plainly an anomaly, but tidiness in the government is not the only
virtue.
5. 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 annot. at 431-34 (1982).
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While independent agencies may not be as independent as they once
were, or as some people think they are today, there still remains a differ-
ence, and no one seems very much in favor of abolishing them. This
balance brings to mind the remark of the pundit who said, "things are
never as good or as bad as they seem," which in this context roughly
translates into the proposition that the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Federal Trade
Commission are neither as dependent nor as independent as they some-
times seem, and the situation seems likely to continue that way for some
time.
